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Abstract
This paper evaluates the intent to treat local average treatment effects of the Colombian 
apprenticeship contract on manufacturing firm dynamics taking advantage of an exogenous 
variation generated by the 2002 labor reform and the regulation design. This evaluation is ap- 
pealing because very little is known about the effects of apprenticeship policies on firm dynamics 
in developing countries. Moreover, although this regulation has been in place for years it has 
not been evaluated. Results using a regression discontinuity design which compares small firms 
subject to the regulation to those that are not, shows positive effects on output per worker (10 
log points), total factor productivity (3 log points) and the share of exported sales (2 percentage 
points). It also shows a negative effect on the average wage bill of directly hired workers (9 log 
points). These results suggest that small firms which became subject to the regulation adjusted 
their labor force more efficiently, thus increasing productivity but did not share these gains with 
workers through higher wages.
Keywords: Apprenticeships, firm productivity, regression discontinuity design.
JEL Classification: C21, D22, O47
1 Introduction
The use o f apprenticeship contracts is widespread in Latin America* 1. These regulations frequently 
link the use o f apprenticeship contracts to firm size, either by limiting the maximum number o f ap- 
prentices, or even by imposing quotas based on the number of regular workers. As such, regulations 
on apprenticeship contracts frequently fall within the category o f size-dependent policies.
The impact of size-dependent policies on the efficiency o f an economy has received increasing 
attention in the growth literature. Guner et al. (2008) have studied the effect of such policies for
* T h i s  p a p e r  i n c o r p o r a t e s  c o m m e n t s  b y  t h e  C E D L A S ’ G r a n t  f o r  G r a d ú a t e  T h e s i s  c o m p e t i t i o n  2 0 1 5  t o  t h e  s e c o n d  
c h a p t e r  o f  m y  d o c t o r a l  d i s s e r t a t i o n .  I  t h a n k  M a r c e l a  E s l a v a  f o r  h e r  v a l u a b l e  m e n t o r s h i p  d u r i n g  t h i s  p r o j e c t .  A l l  
e r r o r s  a r e  m y  o w n .
b  a c k n o w l e d g e  f u n d i n g  f o r  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  p r o j e c t  f r o m  C E D L A S .  I  t h a n k  a n o n y m o u s  r e f e r e e s  f r o m  C E D L A S  f o r  
t h e i r  h e l p f u l  c o m m e n t s  a n d  s u g g e s t i o n s .
b  t h a n k  m y  d i s s e r t a t i o n  c o m m i t t e  f o r  t h e i r  v a l u a b l e  c o m m e n t s  a n d  s u g g e s t i o n s .  T h e y  a r e :  J u a n  E s t e b a n  C a r r a n z a ,  
P a b l o  L a v a d o ,  C a r l o s  M e d i n a  a n d  A n d r é s  Z a m b r a n o .
1 I L O ’ s  C E I N T E R F O R  r e p o r t s  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  r e g u l a t i o n  f o r  m a n y  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  i n c l u d i n g :  A r ­
g e n t i n a ,  B r a z i l ,  C h i l e ,  C o l o m b i a ,  C o s t a  R i c a ,  E c u a d o r ,  E l  S a l v a d o r ,  H o n d u r a s ,  P e r u ,  P a n a m a ,  a n d  U r u g u a y .  
h t t p : / / w w w . o i t c i n t e r f o r . o r g / j o v e n e s / c o n t r a t o s - a p r e n d i z a j e
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the size distribution o f firms, productivity and output. In the first chapter I showed that labor 
substitution as a response to the apprenticeship contract can affect the allocation and composition 
o f labor among firms (Ospino, 2016) . Understanding the effects o f the apprenticeship contract on 
firm productivity, wages and capital accumulation is vital to designing policies that consider how 
firms are affected, since most evaluations only consider the effects o f policies on those that receive 
training.
In this paper I take advantage o f the exogenous variation in the apprenticeship contract in Colombia 
which made small firms subject to this regulation. I exploit the regulation’s design to identify the 
effects on small firm outcomes o f the use o f apprenticeship contracts. This regulation and the 
relevant features for the analysis are discussed in section 2. The paper is related to at least three 
different branches o f the economics literature. A  set o f studies focuses on the impact of size- 
dependent policies on firm outcomes. This literature is both theoretical and empirical and finds 
that restrictions on the use o f capital or labor which are conditional on firm size can have important 
effects on aggregate productivity. Such policies can explain the emergence o f smaller firms which 
shift the size distribution to the left (Guner et al., 2008; Braguinsky et al., 2011; Garicano et al., 
2013) .
In their model, Guner et al. (2008) find that restrictions on labor use have larger effects on output, 
firm size and productivity, than restrictions on capital use because there are general equilibrium 
effects, where the most important are lower wages and the creation of smaller firms. The mech- 
anism is the following. Higher labor costs reduce total labor demand which lowers wages. Lower 
wages make less productive firms profitable and induces the emergence o f smaller firms. In this 
sense, Braguinsky et al. (2011) and Garicano et al. (2013) provide evidence on size-dependent la­
bor regulation in Portugal and France respectively, which affects labor allocation and productivity. 
Braguinsky et al. (2011) argue that the level of employment protection in Portugal, which they 
consider among the highest in OECD countries, explains a size distribution o f firms shifted to the 
left with respect to countries with less restrictive regulations. Their argument is that employment 
protection regulation affects disproportionately larger firms than smaller ones, thus providing in­
centives to reduce size. Finally, Garicano et al. (2013) argue that employment protection laws 
that affect firms with at least 50 workers in France, explain important dead-weight losses that can 
be as high as 5% of GDP. The current paper contributes to this literature by providing empirical 
evidence o f how a size-dependent regulation in a developing country affects the allocation o f labor 
and capital around the threshold where the regulation kicks in.
A  second group o f studies focuses on the impact o f apprenticeship contracts and other forms of 
training on firm labor productivity. The main message from this literature is that evaluating 
training policies by just focusing on the wages o f trainees is insufficient to capture all the benefits 
o f training, since it ignores increases in labor productivity. It finds that labor productivity gains 
can be twice as much as wages gains, but these gains differ across economic sectors (Dearden et al., 
2006; Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2009; Konings and Vanormelingen, 2010) . Dearden et al. (2006) 
find that the impact o f training on wages is half the impact on firm labor productivity (0.35 and 
0.60, respectively), thus providing evidence of the underestimation o f the impacts o f training when 
using wages alone. They also show that this result is driven by sectors with low wages, suggesting 
that the monopsony power by firms in these sectors allows for the difference between wages and 
productivity gains. Mohrenweiser and Zwick (2009) use matched employer-employee level data to 
estimate the impacts o f training apprentices on productivity measures of German firms between 
1997 and 2002. The paper’s main contribution is testing whether all sectors face costs o f increasing 
the share o f apprentices, something that was taken for granted in the literature; they do this by
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considering apprentices in different types o f occupations: manufacturing, craft and construction, 
and commercial occupations, within firms. In particular, only in the manufacturing sector an 
increase in the share of apprentices reduces net profits, but has no effect on labor productivity 
(measured as value-added per worker). Konings and Vanormelingen (2010) study how voluntary 
job  training undertaken by Belgian firms affects firm productivity. They use a panel of firms 
that report detailed information about training expenditures, the intensity o f training and the 
share o f trained workers. They find that the productivity premium for trained workers relative 
to those that did not receive training is 23% while the wage premium is 12%. They conclude 
that in this context it is optimal for firms to provide training since productivity rises by a higher 
factor than the rise in wages. This effect is known as wage compression (Acemoglu and Pischke, 
1999) . W hile this literature has assessed the effect o f voluntary training on workers and firms, in 
Colombia apprenticeship contracts are mandatory. This type o f regulation has not been assessed 
and constitutes a relevant contribution to the training literature.
Finally, the paper is related to the literature about the effects o f labor regulation reforms on the 
manufacturing sector’s performance (Besley and Burgess, 2004; Eslava et al., 2004) . Besley and 
Burgess (2004) exploit state level variation over time in amendments to the Industrial Dispute Act 
(IDA) o f 1947, using data from 1958 to 1992 and find that pro-worker legislation in India had a 
negative effect on investment, employment, productivity and output of formal manufacturing firms. 
It also increased informal manufacturing activity. Eslava et al. (2004) studied the role of factor 
allocation and demand shocks in explaining changes in productivity after several reforms took place 
in Colombia in the early 1990’s. While their focus is not exclusively on labor reforms, they find that 
after the reforms in the 90’s the allocation o f production towards more productive firms increased 
total factor productivity. The current paper provides evidence o f how a particular size-dependent 
regulation reform to a flexible form of contracting that took place in 2002 and has not yet been 
evaluated affected manufacturing firms’ performance in an institutional context which is different 
from India but that nonetheless shares some similarities. For example, Ospino (2016) shows that 
the change in the apprenticeship contract regulation is associated with an increase in the use of 
outsourced labor contracts in Colombia. Bertrand et al. (2015) show that the IDA, a size-dependent 
regulation, is associated with the increased use o f contract labor from staffing companies by Indian 
firms with more than 100 workers. Bertrand et al. (2015) find that the availability o f a flexible 
form o f contracting allowed firms to invest in risky projects, increase total labor demand and cope 
with demand shocks in spite of the tight labor regulation they are subject to. Therefore, I will test 
whether the observed labor outsourcing by Colombian small manufacturing firms as a response to 
the apprenticeship contract is associated with capital investment decisions by firms.
The paper is structured as follows. The first section is this introduction. In section 2 I look at the 
relevant features o f the regulation which are important for its evaluation. In section 3 I explain 
the empirical approximation to evaluate the effects of this policy on firm performance. In section 
4 I discuss validity tests for the empirical approximation as well as the results o f the econometric 
exercises. Finally section 5 ends with a discussion o f the main findings and its implications for 
public policy. In the Appendix I provide additional results and robustness checks for the main 
exercise.
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2 Regulatory framework
2.1 Regulation before 2003.
Law 188 of 1959 established the nature o f the apprenticeship contract as a labor contract. Ap- 
prentices were employees of the firm and the labor code regulated this working relationship. Their 
salary could not be lower than 50% of the minimum wage and it had to increase as the appren- 
tice gained knowledge in her craft until it reached at least a full minimum wage. Decree 2838 of 
1960 established that employers with more than US$15,0002 in capital or more than 20 permanent 
workers, had the obligation o f hiring apprentices. The number o f apprentices could not exceed 5% 
of firm personnel. Given that apprenticeships could only be hired for occupations defined by the 
labor ministry based on recommendations by SENA (Colom bia’s vocational and training institu- 
tion), only students o f programs offered or recognized by SENA could be hired using apprenticeship 
contracts. The prevalent form of compliance with the regulation was modifying regular workers 
labor contracts and providing time for training. This practice allowed employers to train their 
workforce at SENA’s nocturnal programs while these continued to work in their regular daily shift. 
Such an alternative allowed firms to comply with the regulation without affecting their labor force 
or reducing production. Accordance 007 o f 2000 established that the regulated quota would be 
determined using the number of skilled workers at the firm. The amendment defined skilled worker 
as those in the list occupations for which an apprenticeship contract could be signed. In practice 3 
the apprenticeship quota was calculated using only the number o f non-production regular workers 
which was known as the “administrative staff” at the firm.
2.2 Regulation after 2003.
Law 789 of 2002 was a major labor reform approved on December 27 o f that year, which overhauled 
among other things, the apprenticeship contract regulation. For example, article 30 changed the 
legal nature o f the apprenticeship contract from a regular labor contract to a special form of hiring 
which no longer implied an employer-employee relationship. The law limited the duration o f each 
contract to a maximum of 2 years and stated that apprentices must receive a monetary stipend. 
Thus, starting in January o f 2003 apprentices were no longer considered firm employees. This 
same article established that compensation will be as follows: 50% of a minimum wage during the 
classroom training phase and 75% for the duration o f the on-the-job training phase (100% of a 
minimum wage in the case university students4.).
Article 32 states that firms which hire at least 15 workers in any sector, except in construction, 
are obligated to hire apprentices for the occupations related to their economic activity. Article 33 
defined the regulated quota (RQ ) as the minimum number o f apprentices the firms must hire. Firms 
subject to regulation must hire one apprentice for every 20 regular workers, and they must hire an 
additional apprentice if the number o f workers is a multiple o f 10. Therefore firms between 15 and 
29 direct workers must hire one apprentice, firms between 30 and 49 workers must hire two, those 
between 50 and 69 workers must have three apprentices and so on5. This same article states that if 
the apprenticeship contract were to end for any reason, the firm must replace the apprentice so that
2$ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0  C o l o m b i a n  p e s o s  o f  t h e  t i m e ,  c o n v e r t e d  u s i n g  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  p r o v i d e d  b y  C o l o m b i a ’ s  c e n t r a l  b a n k .
3 I  t h a n k  L i z e t h  C o r t e s  f o r  p r o v i d i n g  h e l p f u l  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  r e g u l a t i o n
4 U n i v e r s i t y  s t u d e n t s  c a n  o n l y  b e  h i r e d  d u r i n g  t h e  o n - t h e - j o b  t r a i n i n g  p h a s e .
5 U n i v e r s i t y  s t u d e n t s  c a n  o n l y  b e  h i r e d  t o  f u l f i l l  m a x i m u m  2 5 %  o f  t h e  r e g u l a t e d  q u o t a .
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it always fulfills its RQ. Article 34 established an alternative way o f complying with the RQ, which 
is called “monetizing” . Under this option firms must pay a monthly fee to SENA. It is calculated 
by multiplying 5% of their labor force size, excluding contractors and temporary workers, times the 
minimum wage. Article 35 established that the apprentice selection process will be carried out by 
firms, but current or past employees can’t be hired under apprenticeship contracts. Apprenticeship 
contracts cannot be renewed once they’ve expired which implies that the same person can not be 
an apprentice more than once while obtaining a degree.
Apprenticeship contracts require firms to incur in other costs. In addition to an apprentice’s 
compensation, decree 933 (Signed in April) o f 2003 established that firms must pay health and 
professional risk insurance for apprentices as if they earned a full minimum wage6. Given that 
apprentices are not considered firm workers they are less costly than a minimum wage worker 
during their productive phase. (Health costs amount to 8.5% while professional risk insurance 
range from 0.348% to 8.7%, depending on the economic activity o f the firm. See footnote 6) . A 
transitory paragraph in article 11 established that firms for which SENA had not established the 
RQ must do so themselves within 2 months o f the decree’s publication. Therefore in practice, all 
firms must have complied with the new regulation by June o f 2003. Paragraph 1 allowed firms 
with less than 15 regular workers to voluntarily have one apprentice even though these firms were 
in no obligation to do so. This option was initially only allowed for firms with less than 10 workers 
in Law 789 of 2002. Paragraph 2 of article 11 allows the firm to split the RQ among its different 
plants according to its needs. Paragraph 3 allows firms to hire up to twice its RQ as long as 
the firm does not reduce the number o f regular employees used to calculate the quota. Article 14 
established the sanctions for not complying with the RQ in the amount o f a full minimum wage for 
every apprentice not hired or monetized, in addition to the amount due, including interest.
In short, the current regulation applies to a broader group o f firms (especially small firms) than 
before the reform took place since the quota is calculated based on the total number o f regular 
workers and not just non-production staff. In practical terms this modification more than doubled 
the number o f apprenticeship contracts between 2002 and 2003 from 33,000 to 72,000 per year 
across all economic sectors. However, it isn’t clear whether the regulation generated more costs than 
benefits for firms. While apprentices cost less during their productive phase than minimum wage 
workers7, firms are required to pay for them even during their classroom training which becomes a 
net cost since classroom training can be as long as 75% of the apprenticeship’s duration.
Finally, firms subject to the regulation face other administrative costs which are not easy to quantify. 
For example, in July and December of every year firms must fill out forms informing SENA whether 
the number o f workers hired during the past semester changed in a way which affects its RQ. In 
these forms firms must detail the number o f workers in each occupation and the number o f hours 
they work in a typical week. Once the form is filled out, firms must wait for the expedition o f a legal 
document (Resolución) which determines the new official quota. Further, selection and interview 
o f apprentices must be performed exclusively from the pool of candidates SENA lists in its website 
and the firm must incur in the affiliation costs of apprentices to social security and professional risks 
insurance. These administrative costs are more likely to be important for firms around the first 
threshold o f compliance with the apprenticeship contract since it implies incurring in the learning
6In Colombia the minimum wage is high and binding (Maloney and Mendez, 2004) . Non-wage labor costs in 
Colombia include severance payments, health and pension contributions, payroll taxes, two annual bonuses, vacation 
compensation, and a transportation subsidy, all o f which amounts to 66.6% for minimum wage workers (Mondragon- 
Velez et al., 2010) .
7The apprenticeship contract regulation states that if the national unemployment rate falls below 10% apprentices 
must be paid a full minimum wage. The unemployment rate didn’t reach single digit levels in Colombia until 2010.
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costs of complying with a new regulation.
3 Empírica! approximation
I now describe the data, the variables o f interest and the econometric models to be used in estimating 
the impact o f apprenticeship contracts on firm dynamics.
3.1 Data
The data for the main analysis comes from Annual Manufacturing Survey (E AM by its initials in 
Spanish) for the years 2001-20048. Rather than a survey as its name suggests, EAM  is a census 
o f all formal manufacturing Colombian firms who hire at least 10 employees or generate an output 
value of at least 35,000 USD. The number o f manufacturing establishments range from 7.909 in 1995 
to 9.809 in 2011. It has very detailed information on output, sales, asset investments and interme- 
diate materials consumption, as well as labor demands broken down by different worker categories 
(e.g. temporary, permanent, men, women, skilled, managerial, production, non-production.) This 
information allows the estimation o f production functions from which TFP is recovered. The data 
are proprietary, administered by the National Statistical agency (DANE) and must be accessed 
on-site at D AN E’s External Special Processing Room  (SPEE  for its initials in spanish).
3.2 Construction of outcome and contro! variables
All monetary variables are expressed in 2011 prices using D AN E’s producer price index (IPP). The 
IPP varies by industry class at the two digit ISIC code (CIIU Revisión 3 AC).
Output.-It is measured as the wholesale value o f all goods manufactured by the establishment 
net o f indirect taxes.
Investment.-It  is constructed as the net purchases of assets, excluding buildings and land.
Capital.-It is constructed using the iterative equation K t =  K t - 1 * (1 — S) +  It. Where S is 
the depreciation rate (which was set to 5%) and It is asset investment by firms. The capital 
measure also excludes buildings and land purchases or sales.
TFP.--Total factor productivity was estimated using the methods by De Loecker and Warzyn- 
ski (2012) and De Loecker (2013) . These authors estimate a parametric Cobb-Douglas pro­
duction function, f  (k, l, m) =  Akal3ma. Where k is capital, l is labor, and m is intermediate 
materials. Total factor productivity follows an order 1 autoregressive process which also a 
function of past exporting status9.
Skilled and Unskilled labor.-Skilled labor is defined as production professionals and techni- 
cians, while unskilled labor is defined as production laborers and operators. Both categories 
exclude non production workers and apprentices.
8I also constructed a longer longitudinal versión of the dataset for the period 1995-2011 following the methods 
proposed by Eslava and Melendez (2011). This latter dataset was used to test the validity of using a difference-in- 
difference approximation for the current analysis.
9A second method to estimate production function parameters used the parameters estimated by Eslava et al. 
(2004) for the period 1982-1998 to construct TFP.
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Wage bill.-Direct labor wage bill, includes wages o f permanent and temporary workers di- 
rectly hired by the firm but excludes social security payments and benefits o f these workers. 
Outsourced labor wage bill includes the payments of all production workers hired through 
temporary third party agencies.
Exports.-Two variables were used. The first variable indicates whether the firm is an exporter 
or not. Exporters are defined as any firm reporting positive amounts o f the share o f sales 
exported. A  second variable measures the share o f sales exported, in levels.
3.3 Empirical strategy
An empirical evaluation o f the impact of the Colombian apprenticeship contract on firm outcomes 
is appealing for several reasons. The natural experiment generated by the reform allows the esti- 
mation o f the causal effect of this regulation on measures of firm productivity such as total factor 
productivity (T F P ) and output per worker. Given that the empirical strategy to identify the pa­
rameter o f the production function from which TFP is recovered, rests on the assumption that 
TFP evolves conditional on the exporting status o f firms, it makes sense to explore whether the 
regulation also had an impact on the likelihood and the levels o f exporting. It also allows to test 
whether this regulation had an impact on the substitution o f capital for labor and on firm invest- 
ment. While Ospino (2016) showed that the apprenticeship contract is associated with a reduction 
in total labor demand and the substitution between direct and outsourced labor, his model did 
not incorporate capital and thus was not able to answer whether firms also substituted labor for 
capital as a response to the policy. Finally, In addition to its negative effects on labor demand this 
regulation could have affected worker wages. Therefore, an evaluation o f its effects on the average 
expenditures on workers wages will be carried out.
The 2002 reform to the apprenticeship contract regulation affected firms in two ways: 1) Many small 
firms that were not subject to the apprenticeship contract regulation before 2002 were required to do 
so starting in 2003. 2) The regulation that is currently in place generates heterogeneity in the share 
o f apprentices that firms must hire. These shares change discontinuously at specific thresholds. This 
paper exploits the first feature and leaves the second one to be addressed in a subsequent paper10. 
Finally, the Colombian apprenticeship contract is similar to the ones used in other Latin American 
countries and apprenticeship contract regulations are a topic o f regional interest. See Fazio et al. 
(2016) and http://blogs.iadb.org/trabajo/category/aprendices/ for a series of blogs on the 
subject by The Inter-American Development Bank’ labor markets division. The key difference in 
Colombia is its compulsory quota but it is, nevertheless, a useful regulation to understand how 
apprenticeship contracts can affect firm performance.
To evaluate the impact of being subject to the apprenticeship contract, an appealing methodological 
approach is a Difference-in-Difference (DD) estimation because it exploits the fact that before the 
regulation changed some small firms were not subject to the regulation and in spite o f the change 
they are still not required to comply with it while other firms o f similar size are. A  deeper analysis of 
the data showed that the assumptions necessary for the DD estimation did not hold. In particular 
I found evidence o f anticipation effects and trends did not follow a common-trend pattern11. Given 
these findings, to take advantage o f the regulation threshold which separates near identical firms
10An earlier versión of this paper estimated the impact of the share of apprentices on the outcomes of interest for 
several thresholds. For consistency with the first chapter in my doctoral dissertation which restricts the analysis to 
the first threshold, the committee recommended that the other thresholds be studied in another paper.
11These exercises are available upon request.
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from having to comply with the apprenticeship contract, a regression discontinuity design was 
preferred.
As discussed, the changes introduced by the 2002 reform can be exploited under a regression discon­
tinuity design (RDD) to determine the effects o f the apprenticeship contract on firm performance 
for firms around the regulation threshold. This m ethodology relies on the similarities of the groups 
which are being compared. Firms locating before the threshold of compliance with this regulation 
were likely to be similar to those which have to comply with it before the regulation changed. Notice 
first that the 2002 regulation changed the threshold level o f compliance with the regulation from 20 
to 15 workers. And second, it changed the type o f workers considered to determine the mandatory 
quota from management staff to all directly hired workers. Therefore it’s very unlikely that firms 
had incentives to change their directly hired labor demand at the threshold of compliance with the 
regulation before the reform was in effect. If firms had no incentives, and did not systematically 
modify the number of directly hired workers in 2002 to avoid compliance once the regulation was 
in place, then treatment assignment into the regulation is “as good as” randomly assigned at the 
threshold, and a RDD may be valid (Lee and Lemieux, 2009) .
The validity o f the RD D  rests on the limited capacity of firms to perfectly control the assignment 
variable (the number of directly hired workers in the apprenticeship contract regulation), therefore 
such limited capacity is assumed. If it’s costly for firms in the short run to adjust the number of 
directly hired workers, then these firms will not systematically fire workers in order to avoid being 
subject to the regulation. This could be due to a number o f legal factors such as severance payments 
and contractual clauses, or economic factors such as positive demand shocks and technological 
requirements in the production process. Figure 10 shows that in 2002 and 2003 a couple o f new 
firms hiring 15 direct workers appear in the data whereas in 2004 and 2005 no new firms are located 
exactly at this regulation threshold. This suggests that either firms did not anticipate the changes 
introduced by the regulation at the threshold, or that they did not have incentives to avoid locating 
at this threshold before the regulation was in full effect.
As a technical point, implementing the RD D  to evaluate the apprenticeship contract must consider 
the fact that the assignment variable, the number of directly hired workers at the firm, is discrete. 
In this case the limit o f the expected value o f the outcome of interest as we get arbitrarily close to 
the threshold from either side does not exist and thus the only way to identify the model parameter 
o f interest is through a parametric estimation (Lee and Card, 2008; Gelman and Imbens, 2014) . 
I will follow the standard practice of clustering standard errors at each level o f the assignment 
variable as suggested by Lee and Card (2008) . Doing this takes into account the correlation of 
firms that have the same number o f directly hired workers.
Vij =  Po +  P iDij +  m(Ndij,p)jp  +  Dij x m(Ndij,p)ap +  (1)
The model to be estimated is given by equation ( 1) . The assignment variable N dij  is the number 
o f directly hired workers by each firm in 2002. It has been normalized so that it takes the value 
o f zero at the threshold cut-off value (15 directly hired workers). i indexes firms and j  indexes 
each discrete value o f directly hired workers by firms, since standard errors are clustered at this 
level. The advantage o f this normalization is interpreting p0 as the expected value o f the outcome 
at the threshold for firms not subject to the regulation. Dij =  1[Ndij  >  0] is an indicator variable 
that identifies firms that hired between 15 and 24 directly hired workers in 2002. m(Ndij ,p) is a 
row vector o f a second degree polynomial o f Ndij which is also defined in 200212. D ij  x m(Ndij,p)
12A second degree polynomial was used since it provides sufficient functional flexibility and Gelman and Imbens
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allows polynomial slopes to differ for firms below and above the threshold o f compliance.
is the parameter of interest and captures the intent-to-treat (IT T ) impact o f the apprenticeship 
contract on firm outcome y since E[y|Ndj  =  0, D j  =  1] — E[y|Ndj  =  0, D j  =  0] =  fí\. It estimates 
the IT T  parameter since outcomes are measured in the year 2004, but treatment and assignment 
variable polynomials are defined using the observed direct labor demand in 2002. The analysis 
takes the year 2004 as the main estimation sample for two reasons: 1) Ospino (2016) shows that 
firm labor demand responded to the change in the apprenticeship contract regulation starting in 
2004. 2003 appeared to be a transition year since as discussed amendments to the regulation were 
introduced as far as June of that year. 2) In the year 2003 the number of apprentices hired was 
not reported in the data and these must be subtracted from total employment as apprentices are 
not considered, by regulation, firm workers. Moreover, since having an apprentice implies being 
subject to the regulation, per worker variables would by construction be lower at the threshold 
for treated firms. For these reasons D j  determines whether firms should have been subject to the 
apprenticeship contract given their direct labor demand in 2002.
A  possible concern to the identification strategy may be that firms not subject to the regulation 
could voluntarily hire apprentices. As discussed in the regulation section, this exception was initially 
allowed for firms with 10 or less workers when the regulation changed in December o f 2002, while the 
modifying decree changed this restriction in April o f 2003. My preferred specification will compare 
firms hiring between 11 and 19 workers, thus control firms were not allowed to hire apprenticeship 
at the moment the assignment variable is measured.
4 Results
4.1 Assumptions and validity tests
In this section I carry out standard assumptions and validity test for RDDs to make sure the 
approximation is appropriate for the current evaluation.
Changes in outcomes at the threshold
As Imbens and Lemieux (2008) suggest, graphical analysis is an integral part o f the RDD. In this 
section I show non parametric estimations of the outcome variable around the cutoff value which 
should provide insights for whether there are any effects o f the regulation. Figures 1-9 show local 
linear polynomial estimations that plot the relationship between outcomes in the year 2004 and 
direct labor demand in 2002. These figures show that in all cases the slopes of the functions fitting 
the data appear to be different for treatment and control firms which provides empirical support for 
estimating different slopes in equation ( 1) . W hile point estimates appear to differ at the threshold, 
the 95% confidence intervals are so wide that one can not reject the null hypothesis o f being equal. 
This second point suggests the inclusion o f baseline covariates which may help reduce the sample 
variability o f the estimators (Lee and Lemieux, 2009) .
(2014) warn against the use of higher order polynomials in RDD estimations.
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Figure 1: Average Log output per total number of workers
20 -10 O 10 20
• Sampie average within bin -----------------  Polynomial fit of order 2
Figure 2: Average of Log capital per total number of workers
Source: E A M  2004. F igure p lots loca l linear polyn om ia l o f  order 2 o f  the ou tcom e variable for treatm ent and con trol firms. D ots  represent the
average value o f  the ou tcom e at each estim ation  bin. Shaded areas contain  a 95%  con fiden ce  interval for the estim ation .
10
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Figure 3: Average Log Total Factor Productivity
Figure 4: Average Log Investment
Source: E A M  2004. F igure plots loca l linear p olyn om ial o f  order 2 o f  the ou tcom e variable for treatm ent and control firms. D ots represent the
average value o f  the ou tcom e at each estim ation  bin. Shaded areas contain  a 95%  con fiden ce interval for the estim ation .
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oo _|
Figure 5: Average Skilled/Unskilled ratio
'-o
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Figure 6: Average Log Directly hired wage bill
Source: E A M  2004. F igure p lots loca l linear polyn om ia l o f  order 2 o f  the ou tcom e variable for treatm ent and con trol firms. D ots  represent the
average value o f  the ou tcom e at each estim ation  bin. Shaded areas contain  a 95%  con fiden ce  interval for the estim ation .
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Figure 7: Average Log Outsourced hired wage bill
Figure 8: Average Share o f exporters
Source: E A M  2004. F igure plots loca l linear p olyn om ial o f  order 2 o f  the ou tcom e variable for treatm ent and control firms. D ots represent the
average value o f  the ou tcom e at each estim ation  bin. Shaded areas contain  a 95%  con fiden ce interval for the estim ation .
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Figure 9: Average Fraction of sales exported
Source: E A M  2004. F igure plots loca l linear p olyn om ial o f  order 2 o f  the ou tcom e variable for treatm ent and control firms. D ots represent the 
average value o f  the ou tcom e at each estim ation  bin. Shaded areas contain  a 95%  con fiden ce interval for the estim ation .
No manipulation and local continuity
In this section I show the results o f the McCrary (2008) test o f no manipulation. Local continuity 
tests of baseline covariates, namely intermediate inputs, energy consumption and firm age are 
presented in the Appendix 13.
Table 1 shows the results o f performing a parametric version of McCrary (2008) test o f no manip­
ulation by estimating model (1) on a sample o f the average values o f each variable for each level of 
Nd E (5, 24). The dependent variable is the Log number o f firms at each level o f direct labor de- 
mand. The parameter of interest is D 15 which test whether the (log) number o f firms is statistically 
different before and after the regulation threshold. The coefficient for the treatment variable is not 
significant for the + /  — 6 and + /  — 4 samples. This implies that the hypothesis that the assignment 
variable is continuous at the threshold o f compliance with the regulation cannot be rejected and 
provides evidence o f no manipulation o f the running variable. In section 6 o f the Appendix I show 
that the test is robust to using the number o f firms at each level o f direct labor demand, and that 
the result holds for the + /  — 4 sample when D 15 is defined using the observed direct labor demand 
in the year 2004. As a further robustness check, Table 4 shows that the no manipulation hypothesis 
is valid when the test is performed using the local polynomial density estimation introduced by the 
rddensity command (Cattaneo et al., 2016) . This particular test fails to reject the hypothesis that 
the distribution of direct labor do not differ at the threshold for the years 2002 and 2004. This 
confirms our findings o f the parametric McCrary (2008) test of no manipulation. However it rejects 
the null hypothesis o f no manipulation for the year 2003. For the years 2002 and 2004 the test 
selected a data-driven bandwidths o f [5.521, 5.527] and [5.978, 5.987] to the left and and right of
13Firm age showed a statistically significant difference of one year. Firms that in 2002 had a labor demand of 
directly hired workers that would make them subject to the apprenticeship contract regulation had been established 
a year before firms that would not be subject to it.
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Table 1: Parametric McCrary (2008) test o f no manipulation
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES LN_bin LN_bin LN_bin LN_bin
D 15 =  I(Nd >  0) -0.148*** -0.125 -0.252** -0.011
[0.042] [0.088] [0.108] [0.046]
Nd=Normalized Directly hired demand -0.086*** -0.110 0.002 -0.263***
[0.024] [0.073] [0.094] [0.051]
N j =  Nd Squared -0.003 -0.007 0.013 -0.044***
[0.002] [0.010] [0.015] [0.010]
D 15 X Nd 0.096** 0.098 0.010 0.291***
[0.035] [0.074] [0.095] [0.053]
D 15 X Nd2 -0.003 0.008 -0.019 0.033**
[0.004] [0.010] [0.015] [0.011]
Constant 5.009*** 4.985*** 5.104*** 4.859***
[0.035] [0.087] [0.107] [0.046]
Observations 3,304 1,919 1,582 1,225
Bandwidth + / -  10 + / -  6 + / -  5 + / -  4
model ols ols ols ols
R ob u st standard errors in brackets. *** p <  0.01, ** p <  0.05, * p <  0.1. Treatm ent: Firm s w ith  15-29 d irect w orkers in 2002. C ontrol: 
Firm s w ith  less than  15 workers in 2002. D ependent variable is the Log num ber o f  firm s at each size level. R egression  includes a second degree 
po lyn om ia l and in teractions w ith  treatm en t variable. Standard errors clustered at the assignm ent variable level.
the threshold for each year respectively.
4.2 Estimation results
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics o f outcome variables for the main estimation sample.
Table 3 shows the results o f estimating equation ( 1) for the first threshold of compliance with the 
apprenticeship contract regulation. All columns include a second degree polynomial and interactions 
with the treatment variable, which is measured in the year 2002. Columns (1)-(4) do not include any 
controls, columns (5)-(8) include baseline controls and columns (9)-(12) add industry indicators. 
Baseline controls, measured in 2002, are: The log value o f intermediate materials used in production, 
the log value o f electrical energy consumption in production and firm age, measured as the number 
o f years since it was created. Each group o f regressions uses different samples around the threshold 
o f compliance with the apprenticeship contract. M y preferred specification is column (12) which 
controls for baseline covariates, industry of economic activity and uses the sample o f firms between 
11 and 18 directly hired workers in 2002 (the + /  — 4 sample). Recall that the estimated coefficients 
must be interpreted as intent-to-treat effects.
Results in Panel A, show that the apprenticeship contract had a positive effect on output per 
worker. It increased labor productivity by 10 log points. The increase in output per worker is 
consistent with the fact that firms subject to the regulation reduced their total number o f workers 
(Ospino, 2016) . Panel B shows evidence o f substitution o f labor for capital at the margin, which is 
consistent with the findings of theoretical size-dependent distortion models. These models predict
15
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Table 2: Mean and standard deviations for outcome variables. + / -  4 sample.
Treatment (log) 
Status Out-
put per 
worker
(log) 
Capi­
tal per 
worker
TFP (De 
Loecker
&
Warzyn-
ski
(2012))
TFP 
(Eslava 
et al 
(2004))
(log)
Invest-
ment
Skilled
/Un-
skilled
Ratio
(log)
Average
Wage
Bill
(log)
Average
Wage
Bill-
Direct
labor
(log)
Average
Wage
Bill-
Outsourced
labor
Exports Share of 
Exports
Direct 10.804 9.528 1.913 3.334 9.431 0.125 9.293 8.863 9.109 0.086 2.109
labor<15
[0.949] [1.283] [0.259] [1.106] [1.500] [0.306] [0.434] [0.435] [0.425] [0.280] [11.213]
Direct 10.930 9.591 1.896 3.461 9.736 0.134 9.342 8.916 9.060 0.108 3.217
labor>15
[0.999] [1.236] [0.524] [0.983] [1.553] [0.563] [0.431] [0.451] [0.546] [0.311] [14.204]
Total 10.857 9.555 1.906 3.388 9.561 0.129 9.314 8.885 9.083 0.095 2.573
[0.972] [1.263] [0.393] [1.058] [1.529] [0.433] [0.433] [0.443] [0.494] [0.294] [12.558]
that at the margin firms are constrained in their labor demand and will substitute labor for capital 
(Guner et al., 2008) or other untaxed workers (Ospino, 2016) . The estimated effect is an increase of 
52 log points in capital per worker. Panel C shows a positive effect of the apprenticeship contract 
regulation on firm TFP. Total factor productivity increased by 2 log points as a result of the 
apprenticeship contract for firms subject to the regulation14. Panel D shows that once I control 
for industry, the negative effect o f the apprenticeship contract on firms investment disappear. 
Panel E shows that being subject to the apprenticeship contract regulation did not affect the ratio 
o f skilled to unskilled labor. This result provides evidence that labor substitution o f direct for 
outsourced labor did not affect the skill composition o f production workers. Panel F shows that 
the apprenticeship contract reduced the average wage bill o f directly hired workers by 9 log points 
which suggests that productivity gains were not shared with workers through higher wages. In 
contrast, Panel G shows that the regulation did not have an effect on the average wage bill o f 
outsourced labor. Finally Panels H and I show that the while the apprenticeship contract had a 
positive effect on TFP it did not increase the likelihood o f a firm becoming and exporter, however, 
it increased the share o f sales exported in 2 percentage points by firms already exporting.
The productivity and export impacts may seem small. However recall that the set o f firms where 
these impacts were observed are those around the threshold o f 15 directly hired workers. The 
fact that there’s a positive effect for small firms of having to com ply with this regulation suggests 
that expanding it to all firms would not have a negative effect on firm’s performance and could 
further increase the productivity o f the whole manufacturing sector and apprenticeship slots for 
more workers.
14The coefficient when using TFP estimated from the parameter obtained by Eslava et al. (2004) was 0.213 with 
a standard error of 0.056.
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5 DISCUSSION
As a robustness check, in the Appendix, I show that most outcome variables do not show significant 
effects in the year 2002, for different bandwidth samples. The two exceptions are, the capital per 
worker ratio and firm investment. These two variables showed positive coefficients o f 57.4 and 
39.5 log points respectively, which suggests firms capital accumulation decisions might have been 
affected by other policies or that firms reacted in expectation to the regulation substituting capital 
for labor. For the other variables, the lack o f anticipation effects provide further assurance that the 
results found appear to be the effect of the policy and not o f firms decisions before the regulation 
was introduced. I also carried out the analysis using the sample for the year 2003. As discussed, 
given that labor substitution as a result o f the policy did not take place until 2004 (Ospino, 2016) , 
I did not expect to find significant effects. Section ? ?  in Appendix shows statistically significant 
effects for capital per worker (72.6 log points), investment (49.6 log points), the skilled/unskilled 
ratio (12.1 log points) and the share of exports (3.9 percentage points).
Finally, I estimated the effects following Cattaneo et al. (2016) using the rdrandinf package. These 
results can be found in Table 11 where I show estimations for a second degree polynomial for 
the same bandwidth as the main estimation (+ 4 /-4 ) and the optimal selected bandwidth by the 
package (+ 2 /-2 ). These results are consistent but of a higher magnitude for the average wage bill 
o f direct workers and the share o f exports. Exporting status and the share o f skilled and unskilled 
workers are not significant as in the main results. However, output per worker and total factor 
productivity which show positive and statistically significant effects in the main results are not 
statistically significant in this estimation15. Another difference is that investment had a positive 
effect in the main results while in this estimation the effect is negative and statistically significant. 
Despite the differences my preferred results are the ones in Table 3. One reason is that I ’m able 
to control for industry fixed effects and still obtain results that speak about the manufacturing 
sector as a whole. Second, in Tables 14- 17 in the Appendix I provide evidence about the presence 
o f heterogeneous effects by industry for the outcomes I can be confident about obtaining causal 
effects following Cattaneo et al. (2016) . These results provide support for the empirical strategy 
where I control for industry fixed effects.
5 Discussion
In this paper I have used parametric regression discontinuity design (RDD) methods to evaluate the 
impact o f the apprenticeship contract on Colombian small firm dynamics. Firms showed statistical 
significant differences at the moment when the regulation changed and most outcome variables do 
not follow a common trend before the regulation was reformed. Therefore, a difference-in-difference 
approximation which at first seemed appealing could not be used for this evaluation. Nevertheless, 
the assumptions for implementing a regression discontinuity design held, and therefore I proceeded 
to carry out the evaluation using an intent-to-treat regression discontinuity design.
Results showed positive effects on output per worker, total factor productivity, and the share of 
exports; it showed negative effects on the direct labor average wage bill. The increase in productivity 
measured by output per worker and total factor productivity suggests that the policy could have 
benefited firms by increasing the skill component o f their labor force. The increase in sales exported 
points in the same direction. The absence of effects on the skill composition o f labor suggests labor 
productivity did not increase by firing unskilled labor. However, the negative effect on the average
15TFP calculated using the coefficients from Eslava et al. (2004) showed statistically significant effects of a similar 
magnitude that when I used the parametric estimator in Equation 1.
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wage bill o f directly hired workers and the absence o f effects on the average wage bill of outsourced 
workers suggests that such productivity gains were not shared by firm workers through higher 
wages.
The policy implication o f this paper is that having small firms being subject to the apprenticeship 
contract regulation had on average a positive effect on productivity for this group o f firms which 
reflected in higher output per worker and a higher share o f exports. From the worker’s perspective 
the effect is a negative one since firm’s wage bill per directly hired worker decreased approximately 
by 9%. This result suggests that workers which determine whether firms are subject to the ap­
prenticeship contract regulation or new hires could be the ones bearing the cost o f the regulation 
design. A  rigorous evaluation o f this regulation for apprentices and regular workers employment 
status and wages is a pending subject in Colombia to have a thorough assessment o f the costs and 
benefits o f the apprenticeship contract regulation from the worker’s perspective.
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6 Appendix
Figure 10: Distribution of firms according to number of directly hired workers
Source: E A M  2002-2005. Figure p lots the d istribu tion  o f  new firms in the sam ple accord in g  to  the num ber o f  d irectly  hired w orkers. B ins are o f 
size one.
Table 4: RD Manipulation Test using local polynomial density estimation
Year Test Statistic P > T
2002 -0.517 0.605
2003 -2.729 0.006
2004 -1.051 0.293
N ote: Test carried out using rddensity C attan eo et al. ( 2016)
Parametric McCrary (2008) tests 
Local continuity of baseline covariates
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Table 5: Parametric McCrary (2008) test o f no manipulation. Year 2002
ti) (2) [3] (4)
DÍS -  ¡ (N d >  0) -17.415** -13.209 -41.486* 6.210
[8.113] [17.907] [21.161] [8.976]
=  Direct labor demand -15.579*** -20.037 5.410 -46.733***
[5.353] [14.849] [18.564] [9.926]
N¿ =  Squared -0.366 -1.208 3.387 -7.909***
[0.514] [2.003] [2.883] [1.972]
« is  x  Nd 16.223** 18.599 -3.926 50.267***
[5.987] [14.923] [18.603] [10.093]
Oís x  Nd -0.286 1.347 -4.110 6.395**
[0.601] [2-021] [2.899] [2.061]
Consta nt 146.599*** 142.232*** 169.472*** 121.297***
[7.637] [17.783] [21.131] [8.955]
Observations 3,304 1,919 1,582 1.775
Bandwidth +/-10 + /-6 + /- 5 + /-4
model oís oís oís oís
R ob u st standard errors in brackets. *** p <  0.01, ** p <  0.05, * p <  0.1. D i 5 =  1: F irm s w ith  15-29 direct w orkers in 2002. D i 5 =  0: Firm s 
w ith  less than 15 w orkers in 2002. D ependent variable is the num ber o f  firm s at each  level o f  d irect labor dem and. R egression includes a second 
degree po lyn om ia l and in teractions w ith  d irect labor dem and in 2002. Standard errors clustered at the assignm ent variable level.
Table 6: Parametric McCrary (2008) test o f no manipulation. Year 2004
(I) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
*^"sOAláII1/!* -1.003*** -1.051*** -1.044** 0.049
[0.281] [0.240] [0.390] [0.467]
Nd =  Direct labor demand -0.031 -0.171*** -0.136** -0.230**
[0.034] [0.019] [0.056] [0.069]
N ¿ =  N ¿ Squared -0.002 -0.023*** -0.016 -0.048**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.010] [0.016]
D iS X 0.113 0.442*** 0.371** 0.187
[0.069] [0.070] [0.124] [0.160]
Dl s x N ¿ -0.008 -0.003 -0.009 0.104*
[0.006] [0.009] [0.021] [0.052]
Consta nt 5.365*** 5.331*** 5.339*** 4.839***
[0.122] [0.105] [0.180] [0.215]
Observations 3,015 1,798 1,487 1,152
Bandwidth + /-1 0 + /- 6 + /- 5 + /-4
model oís oís oís oís
R ob u st standard errors in brackets. *** p <  0.01, ** p <  0.05, * p <  0.1. D 15 =  1: F irm s w ith  15-29 direct w orkers in 2004. D 15 =  0: Firm s 
w ith  less than 15 w orkers in 2004. D ependent variable is the L og num ber o f  firm s at each  level o f  d irect labor dem and. R egression  includes a 
second degree p olyn om ia l and interactions w ith  d irect labor dem and in 2002. Standard errors clustered at the assignm ent variable level.
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Table 7: Parametric McCrary (2008) test of no manipulation. Year 2004
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV s -132.406** -177.880*** -168.462** 43.142
[47.525] [48.320] [70.207] [74.835]
Nd Direct labor demand -9.632* -30.621*** -19.063* -38.432**
[5.338] [4.592] [9.338] [11.409]
Nd =  Nd Squared -0.641 -3.962*** -1.739 -7.942**
[0.455] [0.763] [1.726] [2.674]
DÍS X Nd 24.298** 84.884*** 59.580** 26.822
[10.149] [16.087] [20.428] [23.560]
DÍ S X N ¿ -0.726 -1.648 -3.321 18.081*
[0.913] [1.617] [3.885] [8.519]
Consta nt 194.730*** 207.498*** 206.376*** 109.593**
[20.145] [21.393] [32.283] [34.863]
Observations 3,015 1,798 1,487 1,152
Bandwidth + /-1 0 + /- 6 + /-5 + /- 4
model oís oís oís oís
R ob u st standard errors in brackets. ***  p <  0.01, ** p  <  0.05, * p  <  0.1. D 15 =  1: Firm s w ith  15-29 d irect w orkers in 2004. D 15 =  0: Firm s 
w ith  less than 15 workers in 2004. D ependent variable is the num ber o f firms at each level o f  d irect labor dem and. R egression  includes a second 
degree polyn om ia l and in teractions w ith  d irect labor dem and in 2002. Standard errors clu stered  at the assignm ent variable level.
Figure 11: Local Continuity Test: Log Value o f raw materials
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Table 8: Local Continuity Test: Log Value of raw materials
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dí S = I (N d >  0) 0.060 0.264* 0.228 0.090
[0.126] [0.128] [0.143] [0.070]
Nd Direct labordem and 0.041 -0.176*** -0.158** 0.046
[0.044] [0.054] [0.069] [0.025]
Nd =  Nd Squared -0.009* -0.039*** -0.036*** 0.008
[0.004] [0.007] [0.011] [0.005]
DÍS X Nd 0.006 0.382*** 0.412** 0.001
[0.059] [0.099] [0.146] [0.197]
DÍ S X N ¿ 0.011* 0.007 -0.010 0.026
[0.006] [0.017] [0.034] [0.064]
Consta nt 12.579*** 12.286*** 12.305*** 12.493***
[0.090] [0.070] [0.081] [0.022]
Observations 3,197 1,869 1,540 1,189
Bandwidth + /-1 0 + /- 6 + /-5 + /- 4
model oís oís oís oís
R ob u st standard errors in brackets. *** p <  0.01, ** p  <  0.05, * p  <  0.1. Treatm ent: Firm s w ith  15-29 direct w orkers in 2002. C ontrol: 
F irm s w ith  less than 15 w orkers in 2002. R egression  includes a second  degree polyn om ia l and in teractions w ith  treatm ent variable. Standard errors 
clustered at the assignm ent variable level show n in square brackets.
Figure 12: Local Continuity Test: Log Energy Consumption
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Table 9: Local Continuity Test: Log Energy Consumption
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DÍS =  I(N d >  0) -0.069 -0.077 -0.070 -0.090
[0.086] [0.093] [0.120] [0.177]
Nd = Direct labordem and 0.059** 0.024 0.006 0.053
[0.026] [0.061] [0.106] [0.195]
Nd =  Nd Squared -0.006*** -0.012 -0.015 -0.005
[0.002] [0.009] [0.018] [0.039]
DÍS X Nd 0.028 0.127* 0.176 0.031
[0.032] [0.070] [0.118] [0.208]
DÍ S X N ¿ 0.004 -0.003 -0.009 0.019
[0.003] [0.011] [0.022] [0.045]
Consta nt 10.619*** 10.586*** 10.567*** 10.610***
[0.077] [0.083] [0.110] [0.176]
Observations 3,293 1,914 1,577 1,220
Bandwidth + /-1 0 + /- 6 + /-5 + /- 4
model oís oís oís oís
R ob u st standard errors in brackets. *** p <  0.01, ** p  <  0.05, * p  <  0.1. Treatm ent: Firm s w ith  15-29 direct w orkers in 2002. C ontrol: 
F irm s w ith  less than 15 w orkers in 2002. R egression  includes a second  degree polyn om ia l and in teractions w ith  treatm ent variable. Standard errors 
clustered at the assignm ent variable level show n in square brackets.
Figure 13: Local Continuity Test: Firm Age
20 -10 O 10 20
• Sampie average within bin -----------------  Polynomial fit of order 2
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Table 10: Local Continuity Test: Firm Age
s> y. II 1 IV o w 0.366 -0.028 -0.833** -1.068**
[0.732] [0.610] [0.338] [0.478]
N,¡  Direct labor demand -0.543* -0.402 0.492*** 0.496***
[0.326] [0.317] [0.080] [0.153]
=  N,¡  Squared -0.050 -0.032 0.129*** 0.130***
[0.037] [0.047] [0.013] [0.030]
O ís X «d 0.778* 1.016 -0.300 0.684
[0.414] [0.708] [0.947] [1.359]
O ís x  Ni 0.021 -0.088 -0.125 -0.507
[0.045] [0.133] [0.231] [0.443]
Consta nt 18.219*** 18.456*** 19.411*** 19.415***
[0.561] [0.420] [0.086] [0.137]
Observations 3,011 1,887 1,577 1,220
Bandwidth + /-1 0 + /-6 + /- 5 + /-4
model oís oís oís oís
R ob u st standard errors in brackets. *** p <  0.01, ** p <  0.05, * p <  0.1. Treatm ent: Firm s w ith  15-29 d irect w orkers in 2002. C on trol: 
Firm s w ith  less than 15 w orkers in 2002. R egression  includes a second  degree p o lyn om ia l and in teractions w ith  treatm en t variable. Standard errors 
clustered at the assignm ent variable level show n in square brackets.
Table 11: Results using Cattaneo et al. (2016)
Bandwidth [-4,4] [-2,2]
Variable Effect P-Value Effect P-Value
Log Output per worker -0.047 0.424 -0.268 0.508
Log Capital per worker 0.058 0.410 -0.626 0.468
Log Total Factor Productivity 0.026 0.244 0.207 0.622
Log Total Factor Productivity (EHHK 2004) 0.223 0.000 0.442 0.065
Log Investment -0.479 0.000 -0.934 0.014
Skilled/Unskilled Ratio 0.007 0.783 -0.131 0.395
Log Average wage bill-Direct labor -0.186 0.000 -0.215 0.018
Log Average Wage bill-Outsorced labor -0.282 0.000 -0.355 0.155
Exporter 0.013 0.461 -0.116 0.587
Share o f exports 5.622 0.000 1.251 0.005
Number of Observations 7908
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6 APPENDIX
Heterogeneous effects by industries of treatment in selected variables. In this section I show the 
results o f estimating intent-to-treat regression discontinuity design estimations following Cattaneo 
et al. (2016) for all industries in the sample o f main estimations.
Table 14: Log Output per worker
Bandwidth
Industry
[■
Effect
-4,4]
P-Value
[■
Effect
-2,2]
P-Value Observations
15 0.520 0.001 0.323 0.080 1662
17 -0.179 0.401 -1.382 0.406 379
18 -0.505 0.000 -1.083 0.224 887
19 -0.088 0.665 -0.242 0.955 400
20 0.043 0.826 -0.691 0.230 148
21 -0.455 0.004 -0.068 0.220 271
22 0.223 0.098 0.391 0.253 439
24 -0.403 0.133 0.821 0.302 630
25 0.301 0.048 0.020 0.311 583
26 -0.609 0.007 0.472 0.552 399
27 0.037 0.949 -1.591 0.965 148
28 0.084 0.660 -0.246 0.719 480
29 0.345 0.057 -1.469 0.980 409
31 -0.723 0.006 0.482 0.776 169
33 0.386 0.124 -1.012 0.046 57
34 1.511 0.000 1.132 0.088 194
36 0.146 0.276 0.090 0.071 518
15- M anufacture o f  food  p rod u c ís  and beverages; 17- M anufacture o f  textiles; 18- M anufacture o f  w earing apparel; dressing and dyeing o f  fur; 19- 
Tanning and dressing o f  leather; m anufacture o f  luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footw ear; 20- M anufacture o f  w ood  and o f  p rodu cts  
o f  w ood  and cork, except furniture; m anufacture o f  articles o f  straw  and pla iting m aterials; 21- M anufacture o f  pap er and paper p rodu cts; 22- 
P ublish ing, printing and rep rod u ction  o f  record ed  m edia; 24- M anufacture o f  chem icals and chem ical p rodu cts ; 25- M anufacture o f  ru bber and 
plastics p rod u cts ; 26- M anufacture o f  oth er non -m eta llic  m ineral p rod u cts ; 27- M anufacture o f  basic m etals; 28- M anufacture o f  fabricated  m etal 
p rodu cts , except m achinery and equipm ent; 29- M anufacture o f  m achinery and equipm ent n .e .c .; 31- M anufacture o f  electrica l m achinery and 
apparatus n .e .c.; 33- M anufacture o f  m edica l, p recision  and op tica l instrum ents, w atches and clocks; 34- M anufacture o f  m otor vehicles, trailers 
and sem i-trailers;36- M anufacture o f  furniture; m anufacturing n .e.c.
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Table 15: Log Total Factor Productivity
Bandwidth
Industry
[■
Effect
-4,4]
P-Value
[■
Effect
-2,2]
P-Value Observations
15 0.214 0.000 1.013 0.995 1662
17 -0.102 0.052 0.272 0.027 379
18 0.338 0.000 0.433 0.291 887
19 0.170 0.004 -0.055 0.201 400
20 -0.193 0.012 0.028 0.973 148
21 0.063 0.068 -0.130 0.245 271
22 -0.085 0.022 0.017 0.059 439
24 -0.133 0.006 -0.118 0.009 630
25 -0.182 0.000 -0.026 0.012 583
26 -0.200 0.003 -0.410 0.024 399
27 -0.153 0.094 -0.127 0.278 148
28 0.103 0.006 0.046 0.180 480
29 -0.157 0.001 0.351 0.212 409
31 0.333 0.005 0.269 0.911 169
33 0.048 0.716 1.065 0.046 57
34 -0.345 0.000 -0.160 0.419 194
36 -0.010 0.738 0.127 0.070 518
15- M anufacture o f  food  p rod u c ís  and beverages; 17- M anufacture o f  textiles; 18- M anufacture o f  w earing apparel; dressing and dyeing o f  fur; 19- 
Tanning and dressing o f  leather; m anufacture o f  luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footw ear; 20- M anufacture o f  w ood  and o f  p rodu cts  
o f  w ood  and cork, except furniture; m anufacture o f  articles o f  straw  and pla iting m aterials; 21- M anufacture o f  pap er and paper p rodu cts; 22- 
P ublish ing, printing and rep rod u ction  o f  record ed  m edia; 24- M anufacture o f  chem icals and chem ical p rodu cts ; 25- M anufacture o f  ru bber and 
plastics p rod u cts ; 26- M anufacture o f  oth er non -m eta llic  m ineral p rod u cts ; 27- M anufacture o f  basic m etals; 28- M anufacture o f  fabricated  m etal 
p rodu cts , except m achinery and equipm ent; 29- M anufacture o f  m achinery and equipm ent n .e .c .; 31- M anufacture o f  electrica l m achinery and 
apparatus n .e .c.; 33- M anufacture o f  m edica l, p recision  and op tica l instrum ents, w atches and clocks; 34- M anufacture o f  m otor vehicles, trailers 
and sem i-trailers;36- M anufacture o f  furniture; m anufacturing n .e.c.
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Table 16: Log Average wage bill-Direct labor
Bandwidth
Industry
[■
Effect
-4,4]
P-Value
[■
Effect
-2,2]
P-Value Observations
15 -0.087 0.090 0.070 0.771 1662
17 0.402 0.004 -0.823 0.264 379
18 -0.285 0.000 -0.486 0.136 887
19 -0.533 0.000 -0.378 0.011 400
20 -0.244 0.009 -0.895 0.085 148
21 0.131 0.241 -0.036 0.224 271
22 0.327 0.005 0.753 0.404 439
24 -0.376 0.014 -0.435 0.133 630
25 -0.592 0.000 -0.684 0.002 583
26 0.033 0.802 0.476 0.139 399
27 0.836 0.000 1.545 0.664 148
28 0.239 0.004 -0.042 0.983 480
29 -0.252 0.009 -0.522 0.847 409
31 -0.279 0.009 -0.256 0.346 169
33 -0.236 0.135 -0.303 0.229 57
34 0.573 0.000 -0.205 0.095 194
36 -0.472 0.000 0.085 0.001 518
15- M anufacture o f  food  p rod u c ís  and beverages; 17- M anufacture o f  textiles; 18- M anufacture o f  w earing apparel; dressing and dyeing o f  fur; 19- 
Tanning and dressing o f  leather; m anufacture o f  luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footw ear; 20- M anufacture o f  w ood  and o f  p rodu cts  
o f  w ood  and cork, except furniture; m anufacture o f  articles o f  straw  and pla iting m aterials; 21- M anufacture o f  pap er and paper p rodu cts; 22- 
P ublish ing, printing and rep rod u ction  o f  record ed  m edia; 24- M anufacture o f  chem icals and chem ical p rodu cts ; 25- M anufacture o f  ru bber and 
plastics p rod u cts ; 26- M anufacture o f  oth er non -m eta llic  m ineral p rod u cts ; 27- M anufacture o f  basic m etals; 28- M anufacture o f  fabricated  m etal 
p rodu cts , except m achinery and equipm ent; 29- M anufacture o f  m achinery and equipm ent n .e .c .; 31- M anufacture o f  electrica l m achinery and 
apparatus n .e .c.; 33- M anufacture o f  m edica l, p recision  and op tica l instrum ents, w atches and clocks; 34- M anufacture o f  m otor vehicles, trailers 
and sem i-trailers;36- M anufacture o f  furniture; m anufacturing n .e.c.
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Table 17: Share of exports
Bandwidth
Industry
[-
Effect
■4,4]
P-Value
[■
Effect
-2,2]
P-Value Observations
15 18.562 0.000 8.700 0.000 1662
17 29.541 0.000 1.226 0.991 379
18 3.974 0.217 -6.990 0.726 887
19 -2.308 0.660 -3.937 0.860 400
20 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 148
21 -0.031 0.991 -0.402 1.000 271
22 1.101 0.530 -3.089 0.889 439
24 -10.436 0.000 -5.966 0.000 630
25 -8.066 0.000 -7.297 0.000 583
26 1.847 0.009 0.541 0.511 399
27 -4.515 0.423 -4.927 0.000 148
28 6.032 0.000 -2.537 0.028 480
29 8.013 0.001 7.756 0.277 409
31 7.635 0.001 1.300 1.000 169
33 0.258 0.787 2.061 0.046 57
34 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 194
36 -0.061 0.995 0.852 1.000 518
15- M anufacture o f  food  p rod u c ís  and beverages; 17- M anufacture o f  textiles; 18- M anufacture o f  w earing apparel; dressing and dyeing o f  fur; 19- 
Tanning and dressing o f  leather; m anufacture o f  luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footw ear; 20- M anufacture o f  w ood  and o f  p rodu cts  
o f  w ood  and cork, except furniture; m anufacture o f  articles o f  straw  and pla iting m aterials; 21- M anufacture o f  pap er and paper p rodu cts; 22- 
P ublish ing, printing and rep rod u ction  o f  record ed  m edia; 24- M anufacture o f  chem icals and chem ical p rodu cts ; 25- M anufacture o f  ru bber and 
plastics p rod u cts ; 26- M anufacture o f  oth er non -m eta llic  m ineral p rod u cts ; 27- M anufacture o f  basic m etals; 28- M anufacture o f  fabricated  m etal 
p rodu cts , except m achinery and equipm ent; 29- M anufacture o f  m achinery and equipm ent n .e .c .; 31- M anufacture o f  electrica l m achinery and 
apparatus n .e .c.; 33- M anufacture o f  m edica l, p recision  and op tica l instrum ents, w atches and clocks; 34- M anufacture o f  m otor vehicles, trailers 
and sem i-trailers;36- M anufacture o f  furniture; m anufacturing n .e.c.
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